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THE LIBERAL DISCOURSE AND THE 
“NEW WARS” OF/ON CHILDREN 
Noëlle Quénivet * 
“We are urging all governments and armed groups to 
end the military recruitment of children under 18 and to 
release those children already in service. There can be 
no excuse for arming children to fight adult wars.”1 
Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Feb. 12, 2002 
INTRODUCTION 
he typical armed conflict of the last few decades has not 
been one where instruments of high technology such as 
unmanned drone and guided missiles has been used; rather, it 
has been fought by young people with AK-47s2 and machetes.3 
The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leo-
ne, and Uganda illustrate the extensive participation of chil-
dren in hostilities. Since the early 1990s, after Graça Machel’s4 
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 1. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, High Commission-
er for Human Rights Welcomes Entry into Force of Instrument against Use of 
Child Soldiers, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 12, 2002), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=663
3&LangID=E. 
 2. In relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone, see AK-47: The Sierra Leone 
and Child Soldier, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4500358.stm. 
 3. Harold Koh explains that “[j]ust as Rwanda was a ‘low-tech genocide,’ 
committed largely by machete, small arms constitute today’s real weapon of 
mass destruction.” Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2338 (2003). 
 4. In 1993, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and 
the General Assembly requested a report to be produced on the impact of 
armed conflict on children. In 1994, United Nations Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali entrusted this task to Graça Machel, Mozambique’s 
first post-independence Minister for Education. 
T
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seminal report on the impact of armed conflict on children,5 a 
coalition of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and in-
dividual activists has strongly argued against the use of chil-
dren, defined as individuals below eighteen years of age, in 
armed conflict. A black African boy holding an AK-47 has be-
come universally recognised as a symbol of child soldiering,6 a 
situation viewed by many as intolerable. It has been argued 
that a liberal society, which cherishes values such as universal-
ity of human rights, cannot possibly approve of children’s in-
volvement in armed conflicts, since this is contrary to the val-
ues of the civilized world;7 “War Is Not Child’s Play”8 is one re-
cent academic article that astutely reflects this view. This rais-
es a number of questions. What distinguishes this African boy 
from the French, canonized heroine Joan of Arc? Also, why is 
the world’s attention focused on the plight of African children 
when both the United Kingdom9 and the United States of 
America continue to recruit children to join their armed forc-
es?10 The way we look at children, more specifically children in 
conflicts, has changed over time; thus, examining the issue of 
child soldiering in a historical context appears expedient. 
                                                                                                                                     
 5. See Expert of U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (by Graça Machel) [hereinafter 
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children]. 
 6. See Lindsay Stark, Neil Boothby & Alastair Ager, Children and 
Fighting Forces: 10 Years on From Cape Town, 33 DISASTERS 522, 524 (2009). 
 7. See Lisa Hughes, Can International Law Protect Child Soldiers?, 12 
PEACE REV. 399, 399 (2000). 
 8. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, War is Not Child’s Play! Inter-
national Law and the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Con-
flicts, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 57 (2006). 
 9. “The UK . . . remains among a group of fewer than 20 countries which 
continue to permit in law the recruitment of children into the armed forces 
from the age of 16 years. No other country in the European Union and no 
other UN Security Council permanent member state recruits from this age.” 
COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CATCH 16–22: RECRUITMENT AND 
RETENTION OF MINORS IN THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES 8 (2011) [hereinafter 
RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES]. 
 10. “The majority of recent scholarly research relating to children and 
armed conflict has, quite rightly, been directed toward eliminating the use of 
child soldiers by rebel groups in developing nations.” Stephen Brosha, Chil-
dren as Tools of War: Seeking Global Solutions Through Theoretical Analysis, 
2 ATLANTIC INT’L STUD. J. (2005), http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0506-
journal-government-and-the-rights-of-individuals/children-as-tools-of-war; see 
also Jason Hart, The Politics of “Child Soldiers,” 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 
217, 221 (2006). 
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Moreover, childhood is defined by social policymaking predicat-
ed on many factors, including “ideas of what children are or 
normally should be.”11 This, in turn, involves analyzing the 
subject matter from a socio-legal perspective. 
Liberalism, which is based on the concept of human dignity 
and universal human rights, conceives of children’s involve-
ment in armed conflicts as a violation of their human rights. 
Consequently, an international lobbying campaign,12 led by a 
number of human rights and humanitarian NGOs as well as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), has 
attempted to transform the moral value of disapproving chil-
dren’s involvement in armed conflicts into a legal norm that 
problematizes their involvement. The main achievements of 
this campaign, favoring “[a] universal approach . . . perceiv[ing] 
all under-18 recruitment into armed groups as offensive, from 
under-18-year-olds enlisting in state armies with parental 
permission to young teenagers joining an armed group in order 
to defend their own social group to pre-teens abducted and de-
sensitized to the act of killing,”13 have been the adoption of a 
series of hard and soft law instruments such as the Optional 
Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict,14 the creation of the 
United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,15 among oth-
ers.16 This norm entrepreneurship17—of transforming moral 
values into legal norms—has been such a success that it is 
                                                                                                                                     
 11. Allison James & Adrian L. James, Childhood: Toward a Theory of Con-
tinuity and Change, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 25, 32 (2001). 
 12. For a background on progression of the campaign, see generally Peri-
naz Kermani Mendez, Moving from Words to Action in the Modern ‘Era of 
Application’: A New Approach to Realising Children’s Rights in Armed Con-
flicts, 15 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 219 (2007). 
 13. Mary-Jane Fox, Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork 
Gains and Conceptual Debates, 7 HUM. RTS. REV. 27, 42 (2007). 
 14. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/RES/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [herein after Optional Protocol]. 
 15. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY-
GENERAL FOR CHILD. & ARMED CONFLICT, 
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 16. For an overview of the new mechanisms, see R. Charli Carpenter, Set-
ting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issues Emergence and Nonemergence in 
Transnational Advocacy Networks, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 99, 105–12 (2007). 
 17. For a discussion on norm entrepreneurship, see id., at 113–14. 
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commonplace to consider child soldiering as an enormity and 
an affront to human dignity. Criticism against the opinion that 
child soldiering is inacceptable as such has been raised at 
times,18 but it has not been welcome. Nonetheless, the main-
stream view that child soldiering is unacceptable not only fails 
to consider it from a historical perspective19 but also is insuffi-
ciently sensitive to local and regional cultures and traditions.20 
Additionally, liberals contend that law is “the best instru-
ment for securing liberty, empowering humanity, and bringing 
about social change.”21 Yet, the current legal framework does 
not offer such a straight-forward position as three legal re-
gimes apply in relation to child soldiers: the human rights law 
regime that applies at any time (United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child22 and the Optional Protocol23), the in-
ternational humanitarian law regime that only applies in times 
of conflict of an international (Geneva Conventions24 and Addi-
                                                                                                                                     
 18. See David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, 
and the Globalization of Childhood, 109 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 296, 296 
(2007). 
 19. See Hart, supra note 10, at 219. 
 20. In the discrete context of child labor, Timothy Ivins refers to the “‘West 
cultural arrogance’ [that] does not take into consideration local cultural 
norms and needs.” Timothy Ivins, A Contextual Approach to Child Labour, 1 
CROSS-SECTIONS: BRUCE HALL ACAD. J. 36, 38 (2005). 
 21. See Ah-Jung Lee, Understanding and Addressing the Phenomenon of 
‘Child Soldiers’: The Gap Between the Global Humanitarian Discourse and 
the Local Understandings and Experiences of Young People’s Military Re-
cruitment 7 (Refugees Studies Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 52, 
2009); see also BARBARA GOODWIN, USING POLITICAL IDEAS 40–41 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 22. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCRC]. 
 23. Optional Protocol, supra note 14. 
 24. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Conven-
tion), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forc-
es at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva 
Convention), Aug, 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/380 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention IV]. 
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tional Protocol I25) or non-international nature (Common Arti-
cle 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II26), 
and international criminal law which relates to the prosecution 
of individuals having committed crimes in times of armed con-
flict (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, also 
known “Rome Statute”27). 
Whilst it is true that human rights instruments condemn the 
participation and use of children in armed conflict, since 1977 
little, if any, progress has been made in international humani-
tarian law in actually tackling the issue of child soldiering. And 
this is despite the work of ICRC and some humanitarian 
NGOs. A key underlying question remains: why should child 
soldiering between fifteen and eighteen years of age be univer-
sally banned?28 
This Article aims to radically rethink the notion of child sol-
diering in human rights and international humanitarian law in 
order to assess whether a change in the law is indeed neces-
sary. With this view, it begins by exploring how and why the 
phenomenon of child soldiering has gained prominence in re-
cent years. It then examines the current legal framework—
including human rights law, international humanitarian law, 
and international criminal law—in relation to the recruitment, 
conscription, enlistment, and participation of children in armed 
conflict. This Article ends by critically analyzing international 
law in this area through the prism of two values that are es-
sential to liberal thinkers: universality, the idea that liberal 
values apply across cultures, and autonomy, the idea that each 
individual is able to take decisions independently of third party 
interference. The Article concludes that the issue of child sol-
diering is more difficult to grasp than the liberal thinkers pre-
sent it and that “the zero under 18” campaign29 launched by 
                                                                                                                                     
 25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 26. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Proto-
col II]. 
 27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 28. See Lee, supra note 21, at 8. 
 29. The idea behind the campaign is that no child under the age of eight-
een should be allowed to be recruited or take part in the hostilities. This 
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the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict30 is 
unlikely to be successful because it fails to take into considera-
tion the weight of history, politics, and culture. That being said, 
the Article’s aim is certainly not to portray child soldering as a 
positive experience or excuse human rights violations that such 
children suffer once they have, even voluntarily, joined armed 
forces or armed groups. 
I. THE CHILD SOLDIER PHENOMENON 
Undoubtedly, moral and societal values reflect the times we 
live in. As Lisa McNee explains, the constructions of childhood 
“are products of a particular period and a particular cultural 
framework.”31 Until recently, the idea of children taking a di-
rect and indirect part in armed conflicts was commonly accept-
ed as an inevitable aspect of warfare. Yet, the rise of the hu-
man rights ideology and the emergence of the so-called “new 
wars”32 have led child soldiering to be condemned. 
A. Historical Approach to Childhood and Children in Wars 
Social scientists contend that the concept of childhood did not 
exist during the Middle Ages.33 The underlying belief was that 
as soon as children’s abilities grew, so did their participation in 
                                                                                                                                     
campaign is based on the fact that although the UNCRC states that a child is 
anyone under the age of eighteen years old, this definition is repudiated in 
Article 38 that allows for the recruitment and participation of children aged 
fifteen and more. UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 38(3). 
 30. See Zero Under 18 Campaign, UNITED NATIONS OFF. SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR CHILD. & ARMED CONFLICT, 
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/zero-under-18-campaign 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013). One of the campaign’s objectives is to “[e]ncourage 
all States to raise the age of voluntary recruitment to a minimum of 18 
years.” Id. 
 31. Lisa McNee, The Languages of Childhood: The Discursive Construction 
of Childhood and Colonial Policy in French West Africa, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 20, 
20 (2004); see also Lee, supra note 21, at 4. 
 32. As Mary Kaldor summarizes, “the new wars involve a blurring of the 
distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or orga-
nized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence under-
taken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial 
gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by 
states or politically organized groups against individuals).” MARY KALDOR, 
NEW & OLD WARS 2 (2d ed. 2007). 
 33. James & James, supra note 11, at 26. It must also be noted that a 
child’s experience in medieval times highly depended on its social status. 
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society expand. The idea that a person reached adulthood at a 
certain fixed age simply did not exist at that time. One has to 
wait until the late 1990s to see when a consensus began to 
emerge, at least in regard to human rights law, which unequiv-
ocally declared that a child was anyone below eighteen years of 
age.34 Furthermore, in medieval times young people “were not 
granted any sort of special or distinctive social status.”35 By the 
fifteenth century, however, an awareness developed to the ef-
fect that children should be afforded some special considera-
tion, as their social experience and interaction was different 
from that of adults.36 The first legal instrument to recognise 
the specificity of “childhood” was the Geneva Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child of 192437 followed by the more comprehen-
sive Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted in 1959 by 
the United Nations General Assembly38 and finally the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.39 
Despite the acknowledgment that children’s role and place in 
society was different, it remained common for them to partake 
in armed conflicts. Examples include “the drummer boys in the 
American Revolution,” “powder monkeys in the war of 1812, 
the Mexican war, and the Civil War [of the United States],” 
and the Hitler Youth during World War II.40 Closer to our time, 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. See UNCRC, supra note 22; see also Convention Concerning the Prohi-
bition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor art. 2, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. 
 35. James & James, supra note 11, at 26. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924, 
League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21, at 43. Article 25(2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights also specifies that childhood is entitled to spe-
cial care and assistance. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A (III) A, art. 25(s), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
 38. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. 
GAOR, 14th Sess. Supp. No. 16 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Vol. I), at 19 (Nov. 
20, 1959). As Joel Bakan asserts, “[b]y the middle of the [twentieth] century, 
childhood was a robustly protected legal category.” Joel Bakan, The Kids Are 
Not All Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/opinion/corporate-interests-threaten-
childrens-welfare.html. 
 39. UNCRC, supra note 22. 
 40. Kristin Gallagher, Towards a Gender-Inclusive Definition of Child 
Soldiers: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga,7 EYES ON ICC 115, 115 (2010–
11). Twelve year old boys were recruited by Robert Baden Powell during the 
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during the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian president Rafsanjani de-
clared that children as young as twelve should be fighting.41 
Just as is the case today, military apprenticeship or military 
service was an attractive vocation, especially where a formal 
universal education system did not exist.42 In 1999 the Council 
of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement stated that it was “seriously alarmed by the increas-
ing number of children involved in armed conflict and by the 
tremendous suffering endured by those children . . . .”43 Three 
years earlier, in 1996, Machel had published her report expos-
ing the plight of children in armed conflicts.44 As Ah-Jung Lee 
aptly summarizes, “the global discourse is that children have 
no place in war under any circumstance . . . .”45 Despite this 
growing consensus, no one has yet actually addressed the load-
ed question of why child soldiering, defined for the working 
purposes of this Article as an individual below the age of eight-
een who takes a direct or indirect part in hostilities, is so wide-
ly and flatly condemned. To answer this question, one must in-
vestigate two key developments that have occurred in recent 
decades that have radically changed mainstream perceptions of 
child soldiering, namely the growing impact of liberal human 
rights ideology and the emergence of “new wars.” 
B. Human Rights Ideology 
One key development in recent decades has been the growing 
impact of a human rights ideology that finds its foundations in 
liberal thought. Liberalism is committed to a society in which 
individuals can freely and autonomously pursue and realize 
their interests.46 Because liberals tend to view the individual as 
“inviolable” and human life as “sacrosanct,” violence is prohib-
                                                                                                                                     
siege of Mafeking in 1900 to deliver messages under fire. Michael Bartlet, 
Britain’s Child Soldiers, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 11, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/11/britain-child-soldiers-
army; see also Ilona Topa, Prohibition of Child Soldiering—International Leg-
islation and Prosecution of Perpetrators, 3 HANSE L. REV. 105, 106 (2007). 
 41. See Gallagher, supra note 40, at 115–16. 
 42. Mary Jonasen, Child Soldiers in Chad, 10 INTERSECTIONS 309, 311 
(2009). 
 43. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Children Affected by Armed Con-
flict, Council of Delegates Res. No. 8, pmbl. (Oct. 29–30, 1999). 
 44. See generally Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, supra note 5. 
 45. Lee, supra note 21, at 3. 
 46. See GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 37. 
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ited barring the rare cases in which the liberal society is 
threatened.47 For liberals, individual human rights, such as 
those enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (e.g., right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of 
speech),48 are fundamental in any given society. The advent of 
a human rights ideology that began with the adoption of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a range of 
universal and regional human rights treaties has solidified the 
liberal position in law. 
As a result of liberalism’s “rights-based approach,”49 issues 
relating to children have been entirely perceived through the 
prism of human rights. In fact, the first comprehensive report 
on the plight of children in armed conflict50 was based on a 
human rights law framework: the 1989 United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”).51 The seminal 
work of Machel led to a discourse on which “child soldiering is 
an unambiguous violation of universal children’s rights.”52 The 
plight of children in armed conflict is viewed as child abuse and 
a violation of human rights law.53 Remarkably, “[o]ver the past 
20 years, human rights law involving the rights and welfare of 
children has become increasingly focused on children partici-
pating in armed conflict.”54 That being said, it must be stressed 
that in an armed conflict a different body of law, namely inter-
national humanitarian law, acts as the law governing the spe-
cific subject matter of children in armed conflict.55 As a result, 
                                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. See UDHR, supra note 37, pmbl., art. 3, 5. 
 49. Lee, supra note 21, at 6 (noting that the “rights-based approach” refers 
to “humanitarian agencies conceptuali[zing] ‘child soldering’ in terms of a 
clear violation of universal children’s rights and a breach of international 
humanitarian law”). 
 50. Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, supra note 5. 
 51. RACHEL HARVEY, CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14 (2003). 
 52. Lee, supra note 21, at 3. 
 53. See Vanessa Pupavac, Misanthropy Without Borders: The International 
Children’s Rights Regime, 25 DISASTERS 95, 107 (2001). 
 54. Janet McKnight, Child Soldiers in Africa: A Global Approach to Hu-
man Rights Protection, Enforcement and Post-Conflict Reintegration, 18 AFR. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 117 (2010). 
 55. Principle of lex specialis means that a law governing a specific subject 
matter (e.g., international humanitarian law) overrides a law which only gov-
erns general matters (e.g., human rights law). For a discussion on the concept 
of lex specialis, see generally Conor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpre-
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children are protected via human rights and humanitarian 
law56 and attention should also be paid to international human-
itarian law provisions. 
C. Emergence of New Wars 
A second key development in recent decades that has radical-
ly changed mainstream perceptions of child soldiering has been 
the emergence and subsequent proliferation of so-called “new 
wars.” A link can arguably be drawn between such wars and 
the proliferation of the recruitment and use of children in com-
bat.57 These wars stand in stark contrast to contemporary in-
ternational armed conflicts or previous wars of national libera-
tion. 
Three salient features of these “new wars” contribute to the 
increased involvement of children in them. Firstly, modern 
warfare “is an especially aberrant and horrific phenomenon”58 
as such conflicts are typically characterized by the abandon-
ment of all moral standards and the “lack of a clear delineation 
between war and peace . . . .”59 Distinctions between fighters 
and civilians are generally not made,60 and worse still, the ci-
vilian population becomes the target of systematic attacks car-
ried out with extreme levels of brutality and violence (e.g., use 
                                                                                                                                     
tative Process? Lex Specialis and the Applicability of International Human 
Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (Roberta Arnold & 
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008). 
 56. See HARVEY, supra note 51, at 6–7. 
 57. “The Special Representative is of the view that the risk or likelihood of 
the realization of the crimes of conscripting or enlisting children under the 
age of 15 years into the national armed forces, is inevitably high due to the 
nature of some contemporary armed conflicts.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 6 
(Mar. 18, 2008); see also Topa, supra note 40, at 105. 
 58. Rosen, supra note 18, at 298. 
 59. Gallagher, supra note 40, at 116. 
 60. HARVEY, supra note 51, at 5; see also Amy Beth Abbott, Child Sol-
diers—The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 499, 509 (2000); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Statement of Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 6 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf. 
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of systematic rape, torture, ethnic cleansing,61 abductions, 
etc.).62 In such conflicts “opposing sides do not distinguish be-
tween children and adults,”63 for they are all part of the same 
communities. In fact, due to the nature and pattern of this type 
of warfare,64 an increasing number of children have become the 
primary targets of armed forces and opposition groups who ab-
duct or forcefully recruit them into the military factions.65 As 
David Rosen argues, modern war is contemplated as an adult 
enterprise that exploits inherently “vulnerable, weak, and irra-
tional children.”66 Children are deemed to be a ready and ex-
pandable commodity.67 Mary Jonasen also notes that “[a]s the 
number of available men to fight decreases, so does the age of 
potential recruits, from youth to younger and younger chil-
dren.”68 The objectification of children is illustrated by the fact 
that boys are sent to the front and, if killed, simply replaced by 
other boys.69 Children are also regarded by military leaders as 
fearless,70 “cheaper to maintain within the ranks,”71 and “less 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. “The most common objective in [intrastate conflicts or internal power 
struggles in developing countries] is persecution, expulsion and the extermi-
nation of an ethnic group.” Jonasen, supra note 42, at 314. 
 62. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of 
Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 9–10 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf. 
 63. Joseph N. Madubuike-Ekwe, The International Legal Standards 
Adopted to Stop the Participation of Children in Armed Conflicts, 11 ANN. 
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 30 (2005). 
 64. Michael Klaus, Kinder und Krieg—eine Bestandsaufnahme [Children 
in War—A Survey], in FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG & UNICEF, Konferenz: 
Kinder im Krieg [Conference: Children in War] 9, 12 (Aug. 25, 1999), availa-
ble at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01374.pdf. 
 65. See P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 5 (2005); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 41 
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf. 
 66. Rosen, supra note 18, at 298; see also David Rosen, Social Change and 
the Legal Construction of Child Soldier Recruitment in the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 2 CHILDHOOD AFR. 48, 49 (2010) [hereinafter Child Solder Re-
cruitment]. 
 67. Jonasen, supra note 42, at 315. 
 68. Ann Davison, Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident, 12 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 124, 137–38 (2004). 
 69. Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in 
Liberia, 1, 21 (Feb. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia0204.pdf. 
 70. Daya Somasundaram, Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context, 324 
BRIT. MED. J. 1268, 1270 (2002). 
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demanding and easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.”72 
Children, who are known to be unaware of concepts such as 
mercy and sympathy until a later age,73 are often used to ter-
rorize the population, thus increasing the overall level of vio-
lence and contributing to and reinforcing the cycle of violence. 
A second salient feature of the “new wars” that has contrib-
uted to the increasing involvement of children in them is that, 
since these conflicts tend to occur in poor countries, they are 
typically fought with light weapons that are cheap to buy. The 
increased accessibility of small arms74 since the end of the Cold 
War and the decreased difficulty in using such weapons due to 
technological improvements75 have led to a higher number of 
children taking a direct part in hostilities.76 The conflict in Si-
erra Leone is a sad testimony to the institutionalized nature of 
conscription and use of children by armed opposition groups.77 
                                                                                                                                     
 71. Gallagher, supra note 40, at 117. 
 72. Bhavani Fonseka, The Protection of Child Soldiers in International 
Law, 2 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 69, 69–70 (2001). 
 73. See Jo Boyden, Children’s Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: 
Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice, 18 DISASTERS 254, 260 
(1994); see also Gus Waschefort, Justice for Child Soldiers? The RUF Trial of 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 189, 189 
(2010). 
 74. Koh defines “small arms and light weapons” as weapons that can be 
carried by an ordinary person, that are “capable of delivering lethal force” 
and that are “primarily designed for military use.” Koh, supra note 3, at 
2334; see also David Southall, Armed Conflict Women and Girls Who Are 
Pregnant, Infants and Children; A Neglected Public Health Challenge. What 
Can Health Professionals Do?, 87 EARLY HUM. DEV. 735, 739 (2011). 
 75. Davison, supra note 68, at 138; see also Carol B. Thompson, Beyond 
Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique, 80 REV. AFR. POL. 
ECON. 191, 191 (1999); Anatole Ayissi & Catherine Maia, La lutte contre le 
drame des enfants soldats ou le Conseil de Sécurité contre le terrorisme à venir 
[The Struggle Against the Tragedy of Child Soldiers, or the Security Council 
Against Coming Terrorism], 58 REV. TRIM. DR. H. 341, 345–46 (2004) (Fr.); 
William P. Murphy, Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism 
in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars, 46 AFR. STUD. REV. 61, 74 
(2003). 
 76. SINGER, supra note 65, at 45–49; HARVEY, supra note 51, at 66; Koh, 
supra note 3, at 2335; Meredith Turshen, Women’s War Stories, in WHAT 
WOMEN DO IN WARTIME: GENDER AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA 1, 7 (Meredith 
Turshen & Clotilde Twagiramariya eds., 1998). 
 77. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 1603 
(May 18, 2012). 
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This has led to a corresponding increase in the “victimization of 
women and children” alike.78 
Thirdly, a wide range of actors—national liberation move-
ments, insurgents, partisans, rebels, local militia, terrorist 
groups, corporations, and others—are involved in the “new 
wars,” and in practice, it is often difficult to distinguish be-
tween these factions and understand their interrelationships. 
For example, an armed opposition group may use a local militia 
to “recruit” individuals to work in mines. The harvested natu-
ral resources are then sold to a corporation and the money re-
ceived from the proceeds of the resources is used to buy weap-
ons from a terrorist group. In this environment, children are an 
ideal weapon of war. Due to their young age, they “can . . . act 
relatively inconspicuously in war zones, observing troop de-
ployments, dispositions of weapons and noting logistical ar-
rangements without attracting undue attention.”79 As children 
are usually not suspected of being part of the hostilities, they 
are neither monitored nor stopped and searched whilst there 
are on duty. They are therefore an undeniable asset for these 
armed opposition groups, notably because they can provide in-
formation on enemies’ movements and activities and also work 
as a communication bridge for the groups. 
Whilst liberal states such as the United Kingdom recruit 
children into their own armed forces80 and sometimes let them 
participate in conflicts (e.g., Iraq81), they decry the use of chil-
dren in the “new wars”. Three main reasons can be adduced to 
elucidate this seemingly contradictory view and why the inter-
                                                                                                                                     
 78. HARVEY, supra note 51, at 60. 
 79. Frank Faulkner, Kindergarten Killers: Morality, Murder and the Child 
Soldier Problem, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 491, 494 (2001). 
 80. For the United Kingdom’s viewpoint on its recruitment process, see 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ARMED FORCES 
BILL, 2010–12, H.L. 145, H.C. 1037, ¶ 1.50 [hereinafter, ARMED FORCES BILL, 
2010–12]; see also Bartlet, supra note 40. 
 81. For example, between 2003 and July 2005, fifteen soldiers below the 
age of eighteen years old were deployed to Iraq. RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN 
BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9, at 5. Five underage soldiers were also 
deployed between 2007 and 2010. UK Submission to the UN Universal Peri-




ew13thsession2012771268.pdf [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L]. 
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national campaign against child soldiering has focused on con-
flicts waged in non-liberal states. First, there is the acknowl-
edgment that the “new wars” have fostered a culture of using 
and encouraging children to commit unspeakable acts of vio-
lence. International humanitarian law is systematically violat-
ed, and war crimes are chronically perpetrated by all parties to 
the conflict.82 However, liberal states tend to take a range of 
precautions to avoid such violations or at least lessen the oc-
currence of them, all the while being involved in conflicts.83 
Second, liberal states recognize that child soldiers, who are in 
large supply, both perpetuate the cycle of violence and lead to 
the escalation, prolongation, and geographical expansion of the 
conflict. Contemporary warfare as carried out by liberal states 
tends to adopt strategies that allow such conflicts to be geo-
graphically and temporally controlled,84 and also uses technol-
ogies that require high levels of skills, thus providing no par-
ticular incentive for them to use children. Finally and most im-
portantly, the overwhelming majority of children entangled in 
such conflicts have not chosen a military path voluntarily. This 
tends to differ from the experience of such liberal states as the 
United Kingdom, where children appear to willingly opt for a 
career in the armed forces or had responded to a historical call 
in World War I.85 These three main reasons explain why the 
focus of the international campaign against child soldiering has 
been on conflicts waged in non-liberal states. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATING TO CHILD SOLDIERING 
In order to understand the current movement towards ban-
ning child soldiering one must first examine the current legal 
framework in relation to recruitment, conscription, enlistment, 
and participation of children in armed conflict. International 
humanitarian law does not outlaw the recruitment and use of 
children between fifteen and eighteen years of age in armed 
conflict. Yet the ICRC, the guardian of the international hu-
manitarian law treaties, contends that, “[d]espite the rules laid 
down by international law, thousands of children are today tak-
                                                                                                                                     
 82. For examples, see conflicts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
 83. See generally A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 IRRC 165 
(2000). 
 84. For examples, see the conflicts in Kosovo and in Libya. 
 85. Lee, supra note 21, at 3. 
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ing an active part in and are victims of hostilities.”86 In fact, it 
is human rights law that is at the forefront of the campaign 
against child soldiering. Therefore, although this Article exam-
ines these key issues by mostly concentrating on international 
humanitarian law, it also looks at international human rights 
law and, at times, international criminal law to provide a bet-
ter understanding of the child soldier phenomenon. 
Two key issues need to be addressed when examining the le-
gal framework that relates to child soldiering and the liberal 
discourse: the recruitment (conscription and enlistment) of 
children and the participation and use of them in armed con-
flict.87 Whilst recruitment relates to the manner in which a 
child becomes associated with an armed group, the use relates 
to the way in which he/she participates in the conflict.88 
A. Recruitment of Child Soldiers 
1. Definition of Recruitment 
Children are recruited into armed forces and armed opposi-
tion groups in various ways; some are abducted, some are for-
cibly recruited, and others join voluntarily. International hu-
manitarian law—Article 77 of Additional Protocol I,89 Article 
4(3) of Additional Protocol II,90 and Rule 136 of ICRC’s Study 
on Customary International Humanitarian Law91—groups 
                                                                                                                                     
 86. ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, Guiding 
Principles for the Domestic Implementation of a Comprehensive System of 
Protection for Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 11 
(Sept. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ara/assets/files/2011/guiding-principles-children-icrc.pdf 
[hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 87. It must be stressed that “the three alternatives (viz. conscription, en-
listment and use) are separate offences.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 609 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; see also Alison Smith, Child Recruitment 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1141, 1147–48 
(2004). 
 88. Sandesh Sivakumaran, War Crimes Before the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone: Child Soldiers, Hostages, Peacekeepers and Collective Punishments, 8 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1009, 1012 (2010). 
 89. Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77. 
 90. Additional Protocol II, supra note 26, art. 4(3). 
 91. See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 482–85 (2006), available at 
1068 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
these different ways in which children join the armed forces or 
an armed group involved in hostilities under the single term 
“recruitment.” It also useful to remember that the term “re-
cruitment” predates “enlistment” and “conscription,”92 two con-
cepts that are now covered by “recruitment.”93 
As the Commentary to Article 77 Additional Protocol I ex-
plains, whilst the obligation to refrain from recruiting children 
under fifteen is clear, the voluntary enrollment of children is 
neither explicitly mentioned nor prohibited.94 As there is no 
express prohibition of the voluntary enrollment of children un-
der fifteen years of age, it seems to indicate that voluntary en-
listment is allowed by law. In other words, international hu-
manitarian law distinguishes between two forms of recruit-
ment, active recruitment by the armed forces (known as con-
scription) and voluntary enrollment, but only bans the former 
in international armed conflict. By contrast, the Commentary 
to Article 4(3) Additional Protocol II stipulates that “[t]he prin-
ciple of non-recruitment also prohibits accepting voluntary en-
listment.”95 Rule 136 of the Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law does not elaborate on this, though it does 
refer to the Rome Statute96 which distinguishes between two 
forms of recruitment: conscription and enlistment of children 
under fifteen years of age.97 A further distinction is hereby in-
troduced inasmuch as enlistment can be either compulsory or 
voluntary depending on which legal instrument is used. Yet, as 
the Commentary to the Rome Statute clarifies, “[c]onscription 
refers to the compulsory entry into the armed forces. Enlist-




 92. Waschefort, supra note 73, at 196. 
 93. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 607 
(March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; Prosecu-
tor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215. 
 94. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 3184 (Yves 
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
 95. Id. ¶ 4557. 
 96. Rome Statute, supra note 27. 
 97. See id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) (addressing both international 
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts). 
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forces by enrollment, typically on the ‘list’ of a military body or 
by engagement indicating membership and incorporation in the 
forces.”98 A similar position was recently adopted by the Inter-
national Criminal Court (“ICC”) Trial Chamber in the Prosecu-
tor v. Lubanga case99 and the Special Court of Sierra Leone in 
the Prosecutor v. Taylor case.100 Again, a difference is made be-
tween compulsory and voluntary acts. It must also be stressed 
that the Rome Statute applies not only to armed forces but also 
to armed opposition groups.101 
Yet, the distinction between voluntary and compulsory re-
cruitment fails to account for abductions, which are one of the 
chief means used—especially by armed opposition groups—to 
recruit children.102 Indeed, in the past few decades, abduction 
and kidnapping have become the main ways to forcefully in-
clude children in armed groups.103 In some countries, abduction 
of children has reached a level of automaticity. For example, 
during the second part of the 1980s, Resistência Nacional 
                                                                                                                                     
 98. KAI AMBOS ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 261 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 246 (Jan. 29, 
1997), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf. In the AFRC trial, the 
Trial Chamber commented that “the only method described in the evidence is 
abduction . . . .” Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 1276 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx. 
 99. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 608 
(March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
 100. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 442 (May 
18, 2012). 
 101. Article 1 of the Rome Statute stipulates that it has “the power to exer-
cise its jurisdiction over persons” and thus does not distinguish between 
members of armed forces or members of armed opposition groups. Rome 
Statute, supra note 27, art. 1. In contrast, the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (“Optional Protocol”) differentiates between state actors and non-
state actors in this regard, and specifically recognizes the duties of non-state 
armed groups. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(1). 
 102. “Most armed groups recruit children by force.” Madubuike-Ekwe, su-
pra note 63, at 33; see also Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1616 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215. 
 103. See Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 63/241, ¶¶ 29, 51, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/63/241 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
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Moçambicana (“RENAMO”) systematically abducted children 
and forced them to participate in activities against the gov-
ernment of Mozambique.104 A method commonly used to force-
fully recruit children is press-ganging, “where armed militia 
groups . . . roam the streets and public gathering places, includ-
ing school gates, to round up individuals they come across.”105 
Such groups also raid schools and orphanages. A notorious ex-
ample is a 1996 event where the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(“LRA”) captured 136 girls from St. Mary’s College, an Aboke 
school in Northern Uganda.106 Similarly, in 2001, armed groups 
in Burundi abducted 300 children from schools and forced them 
to carry military equipment or help wounded soldiers.107 
With this view, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, whose 
statute refers to two types of recruitment,108 has interpreted 
“conscription” to include “acts of coercion, such as abductions 
and forced recruitment,” for the purpose of using children in 
hostilities.109 Undoubtedly, this “definition of conscription re-
flects its recognition of the changed nature of modern war-
fare.”110 The Special Court also explained that enlistment 
means “accepting and enrolling individuals when they volun-
                                                                                                                                     
 104. Jean-Claude Legrand & Fabrice Weissman, Les enfants soldats et us-
ages de la violence au Mozambique [Child Soldiers and the Function of Vio-
lence in Mozambique], 18 CULTURES & CONFLICTS 2 (1995) (Fr.). 
 105. Madubuike-Ekwe, supra note 63, at 33; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Witness Testimony DRC-OTP-WWW-0046, at 18 
(July 9, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc713215.pdf. 
 106. See generally ELS DE TEMMERMAN, ABOKE GIRLS: CHILDREN ABDUCTED 
IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2d ed. 2001). 
 107. MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 
41 (2006). 
 108. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 4, Jan. 16, 2002, 
available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&. 
 109. Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 734 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx. 
 110. Referring to the judgment of the AFRC Case: “While previously wars 
were primarily between well-established States, contemporaneous armed 
conflicts typically involve armed factions which may not be associated with, 
or acting on behalf, a State. To give the protection against crimes relating to 
child soldiers its intended effect, it is justified not to restrict ‘conscription’ to 
the prerogative of States and their legitimate Governments, as international 
humanitarian law is not grounded on formalistic postulations.” AFRC Case, 
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 734. 
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teer to join an armed force or group;”111 in other words, enlist-
ment does not involve an actual list of new recruits but also 
“children enrolled by more informal means.”112 What it also 
means is that whilst conscription is compulsory, enlistment 
remains a voluntary act. 
International human rights law instruments impose re-
strictions upon states related to recruitment in general. Article 
38 of the UNCRC affirms that “State Parties shall refrain from 
recruiting any person who was not attained the age of fifteen 
years into their armed forces.” The prohibition on recruitment 
of children under fifteen years of age is applicable both in 
peacetime and in times of armed conflict, thereby leaving aside 
the difficult question of qualification of the conflict. Moreover, 
it does not distinguish between compulsory and voluntary re-
cruitment.113 Yet, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (“Optional Protocol”) does make this distinc-
tion,114 thereby espousing a perspective similar to the one pro-
pounded in international humanitarian law and leaving open 
the definition of “voluntary.”115 
2. How Voluntary Is “Voluntary”? 
It is imperative to determine what makes an enlistment “vol-
untary,” since this is the distinguishing factor between con-
scription and enlistment116 not only in international humani-
tarian and human rights law117 but also between lawful and 
                                                                                                                                     
 111. Id. ¶ 735; see also Prosecutor v. Fofana (CDF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-
14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 140 (May 28, 2008), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194. 
 112. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submis-
sions of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 9 (Mar. 18, 2008). 
 113. During the negotiations, such distinction was made but later aban-
doned. Claire Breen, When Is a Child Not a Child? Child Soldiers in Interna-
tional Law, 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 71, 83 (2007). 
 114. Article 3 of the Optional Protocol refers to voluntary recruitment. Op-
tional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3. 
 115. See id. at 89; Breen, supra note 113, at 83. 
 116. See Alice Schmidt, Volunteer Child Soldiers as Reality: A Development 
Issue for Africa, 2 NEW SCH. ECON. REV. 49, 56 (2007). 
 117. However, it must be borne in mind that the Rome Statute does not 
refer to the degree of voluntariness in joining the armed groups. Thus, Alison 
Smith notes that “the forcible or voluntary nature of the recruitment is not 
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unlawful recruitment under international humanitarian law. It 
is argued that the level of voluntariness can be assessed by ex-
amining two factors: whether a child appreciates the conse-
quences of his/her decision and whether there are viable alter-
natives to joining the armed forces or groups. 
In Western states, a minor must make a willing and informed 
decision with the consent of his or her parents or guardians.118 
A range of safeguards exist to ensure that this is an informed 
choice119 by the child.120 This is congruent with state obliga-
tions under the Optional Protocol that stipulates that states 
are required to ensure that voluntary recruitment is genuine 
and not coerced (i.e., the informed consent of the recruits’ par-
ents or legal guardians has been obtained and the recruits are 
well informed about the duties involved in the military ser-
vice).121 In reality, in the United Kingdom, a fair number of 
young recruits come from the “least educated backgrounds”122 
and are visited by army recruiters in economically deprived ar-
eas where these recruits reside.123 This certainly raises con-
cerns as to the voluntariness of young people to join the armed 
                                                                                                                                     
an element of the crime.” Smith, supra note 87, at 1148. In other words, there 
is no defense to recruitment of children under the age of fifteen. See id. 
 118. See Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, § 328(2)(c) (U.K.). 
 119. Elisabeth Schauer argues that a child, and even someone under twenty 
years of age, is not able to give informed consent to joining military. Prosecu-
tor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of Witness Elisabeth 
Schauer, at 90 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf. 
 120. The four safeguards specified in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol are: 
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary; 
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the 
person’s parents or legal guardians; 
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such 
military service; 
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into 
national military service. 
Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Bartlet, supra note 40. 
 123. See Army ‘Targeting Poorer Schools’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/6199274.stm; see also RECRUITMENT OF 
MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9, at 11. 
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forces. Moreover, recruits must be able to leave if they wish to 
do so.124 
Article 3(1) of the Optional Protocol requires states to raise 
the legal age for voluntary recruitment to at least sixteen years 
of age. Upon ratification of the Optional Protocol, states must 
deposit a binding declaration setting out the standards in place 
to meet their legal obligations in pursuance of the Optional 
Protocol. The United Kingdom has adopted the minimum 
standard established in the Optional Protocol—recruitment 
from sixteen years of age onwards—and has failed to issue a 
declaration to abide by the higher standard of eighteen years of 
age. Further, the United Kingdom has deposited a declara-
tion125 allowing for sixteen year olds to be deployed.126 Despite 
                                                                                                                                     
 124. This is a highly debated issue in the United Kingdom. Whilst a recruit 
has a right to discharge “at the end of the first month of training and before 
six months have elapsed since enlistment” once that period has elapsed dis-
charge is at the discretion of the commanding officer. THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON THE ARMED FORCES BILL, THE ARMED FORCES BILL: SPECIAL REPORT OF 
SESSION 2010–11, H.C. 779, at Ev 76. As a result, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights has expressed its concern that this lack of right to leave might 
be in breach of the Optional Protocol. ARMED FORCES BILL, 2010–12, supra, 
note 80, ¶ 1.58; see also RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES, 
supra note 9, at 3–4. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Ob-
servations on Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, transmitted in 
consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 8 of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 16–17, CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/CO/1 
(Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Concluding Observations: UK]. 
 125. The Declaration reads: 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will 
take all feasible measures to ensure that members of its armed forc-
es who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities. 
The United Kingdom understands that Article 1 of the Optional Pro-
tocol would not exclude the deployment of members of its armed 
forces under the age of 18 to take a direct part in hostilities where: 
a) there is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an 
area in which hostilities are taking place; and 
b) by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation: 
i) it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before de-
ployment; or 
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repeated calls by NGOs and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child,127 the United Kingdom has not amended its interpreta-
tive declaration, which has the effect of a reservation, to the 
aforementioned instrument. Although this provision of the Op-
tional Protocol has been criticized for still allowing recruitment 
of children between sixteen and eighteen years of age,128 states 
insisted upon it to keep the armed forces available as a source 
of employment, training, and continuing education for those 
leaving school early.129 Additionally, it is argued that it would 
take a couple of years to train a soldier fully before sending him 
or her to a conflict theatre.130 
During wars of national liberation, a number of children will-
ingly and strategically joined armed groups. Undoubtedly, ideo-
logical attraction plays a significant role in the involvement of 
children in such conflicts131 and this is why Additional Protocol 
I allows the direct participation in hostilities of children under 
fifteen years of age. The Commentary to the Additional Proto-
col I expounds that the Committee that designed this provision 
“noted that sometimes, especially in occupied territories and in 
wars of national liberation, it would not be realistic to totally 
prohibit voluntary participation of children under fifteen”132 as 
“[i]t is difficult to moderate [the children’s] enthusiasm and 
                                                                                                                                     
ii) to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of 
their ship or unit, and thereby put at risk the successful 
completion of the military mission and-or the safety of other 
personnel. 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Declaration upon Signature of the 
United Kingdom, entered into force Feb. 12, 2002, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 126. See Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2009/2057, art. 
4 (U.K.); see also Concluding Observations: UK, supra note 124, ¶¶ 12–19. 
 127. RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9; see 
also Concluding Observations: UK, supra note 124, ¶¶ 10–11; CHILD 
SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 81, ¶ 4. 
 128. See HARVEY, supra note 51, at 28; Jay Williams, The International 
Campaign to Prohibit Child Soldiers: A Critical Evaluation, 15 INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 1072, 1076 (2011). 
 129. Breen, supra note 113, at 71–72. 
 130. Id. at 90–91. 
 131. One may nonetheless question how “voluntary” this type of involve-
ment is. 
 132. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3184. 
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their will to fight.”133 In such cases, the Commentary highlights 
that 
the authorities employing or commanding [children] should be 
conscious of the heavy responsibility they are assuming and 
should remember that they are dealing with persons who are 
not yet sufficiently mature, or even have the necessary dis-
cernment of discrimination. Thus they should give them the 
appropriate instruction on handling weapons, the conduct of 
combatants and respect for the laws and customs of war.134 
This provision in international humanitarian law seems to al-
low recruiters, if prosecuted for recruitment of children under 
fifteen years of age, to raise the defense of consent by the child. 
However, the jurisprudence of various international criminal 
tribunals asserts that consent of an under fifteen year old child 
to taking part in the hostilities does not constitute a valid de-
fense for a recruiter accused of recruitment.135 In other words, 
whilst a child can voluntarily join an armed group, his or her 
enlistment is a punishable offense under international criminal 
law.136 
In the “new wars,” children join armed groups and armed 
forces for a range of reasons.137 The main “push and pull fac-
tors”138 can be divided in three broad categories: (1) “environ-
mental factors,” (2) “factors relating to the child’s personal 
                                                                                                                                     
 133. Id. ¶ 3185. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 613–
17 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; Prose-
cutor v. Fofana (CDF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 
139 (May 28, 2008), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194. 
 136. “Given that both (voluntary) enlistment and (coerced) conscription are 
ways of committing the same offence, the question of consent loses its rele-
vance for the purposes of conviction.” Roman Graf, The International Crimi-
nal Court and Child Soldiers: An Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment, 10 
JICJ 945, 956 (2012). 
 137. For an excellent overview, see Rachel Brett, Adolescents Volunteering 
for Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 85 IRRC 857, 859–62 (2003) (claiming 
that there are “five major factors in the decision of youngsters to join armed 
forces or armed groups” without being coerced: “war, poverty, education, em-
ployment and family”). 
 138. For the origins of this expression, see Somasundaram, supra note 70, 
at 1268. 
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characteristics and histories,” and (3) “trigger events.”139 Fac-
tors include economic hardship and poverty,140 the lack of op-
portunities,141 a sense of belonging, ideological attraction, feel-
ings of revenge,142 survival, the loss of parents and relatives 
able to protect them,143 the need to find a safe environment,144 
the impression that one is able to act free of coercion, and thus 
be proactive rather than passive and victimized,145 fear of being 
abducted,146 etc. Children may also be sent by their families to 
defend the community147 or to find a basic source of income. In 
other cases, school curricula contain military elements, which 
contribute to the indoctrination of the children who may wish 
to join “willingly,” yet are arguably not fully able to understand 
the ideological nature of their decision or to adequately assess 
the implications of their decisions and actions.148 It is the com-
bination of these factors that accentuates and amplifies the 
                                                                                                                                     
 139. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 52. Based on the conflicts in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, William Murphy four categories of child solders: “coerced youth,” 
“revolutionary youth,” “delinquent youth,” and “youth clientalism.” Murphy, 
supra note 75, at 64–66. 
 140. MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005); 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict—
Towards Universal Ratification, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 535, 536 (2010). 
 141. WESSELLS, supra note 107, at 50. 
 142. Diane Taylor, I Wanted to Take Revenge, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/07/westafrica.congo; Coomaraswa-
my, supra note 140, at 536. 
 143. HAPPOLD, supra note 140, at 13; WESSELLS, supra note 107, at 49. 
 144. SINGER, supra note 65, at 64 (noting that “children may decide they are 
safer in a conflict group, with guns in their own hands, than going about by 
themselves unarmed.”). 
 145. See Hughes, supra note 7, at 403. 
 146. Harendra de Silva, Chris Hobbs & Helga Hanks, Conscription of Chil-
dren in Armed Conflict—A Form of Child Abuse. A Study of 19 Former Child 
Soldiers, 10 CHILD ABUSE REV. 125, 128 (2001). 
 147. “Societal attitudes, as advanced by community leaders, teachers and 
parents, and their peers can direct children to the conclusion that that the 
best way of . . . displaying maturity and becoming a full member of the collec-
tive is to join the struggle.” HAPPOLD, supra note 140, at 140; see also Prose-
cutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Witness Testimony DRC-OTP-
WWW-0046, at 18 (July 9, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc713215.pdf; Child Solder Recruitment, supra note 66, at 
51 (illustrating example of children enlisting in the Kamajors in Sierra Leo-
ne). 
 148. See de Silva, Hobbs & Hanks, supra note 146, at 130. 
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child’s willingness to take a part in the hostilities. Voluntary 
recruitment in this specific context is defined as not being ab-
ducted or physically forced to join a party to the conflict, as a 
“coerced choice.” In her written submission to the ICC in the 
Lubanga case, the Special Representative stressed that “[t]he 
line between voluntary and forced recruitment is therefore not 
only legally irrelevant but practically superficial in the context 
of children in armed conflict.”149 Whilst the Special Representa-
tive prefers to ignore the relevance of the variety of push and 
pull factors that lead a child into soldiering, others claim that 
along a continuum starting with informed consent and ending 
with abduction there are various degrees of choices.150 As Ra-
chel Brett aptly notes, “the degree of choice varied,”151 and Al-
ice Schmidt stresses, “children choose to join armed groups de-
spite having alternatives that—under the given circumstanc-
es—are acceptable.”152 Also, a fair number of children who 
joined armed groups believed that they would be able to leave 
at any time or had no, or very little, idea of what war really en-
tailed.153 
3. Conscription 
Conscripting children under fifteen years of age is clearly 
prohibited under international humanitarian and human 
rights law treaties, customary international humanitarian 
law,154 and international criminal law.155 Article 2 of Optional 
Protocol outlaws the compulsory recruitment of persons under 
the age of eighteen years. Whilst conscription is clearly banned 
                                                                                                                                     
 149. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submis-
sions of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 14 (Mar. 18, 2008). 
 150. Whilst in social sciences it might be possible to conceive of voluntari-
ness along a continuum or spectrum, in law, a distinction must unfortunately 
be made unless all participation is deemed lawful or unlawful. For a discus-
sion on the possibility to think of voluntariness along a continuum or spec-
trum, see Schmidt, supra note 116, at 55–57. 
 151. Brett, supra note 137, at 863. 
 152. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 54. 
 153. Brett, supra note 137, at 863. 
 154. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 485. 
 155. The Rome Statute provides that “‘conscripting or enlisting children’ 
into armed forces or groups constitutes a war crime in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.” Id. at 483 (citing Rome Statute, supra 
note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii)). 
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with regard to children under fifteen years of age, the question 
is whether it is also banned with regard to children between 
fifteen and eighteen years of age. Again, international human 
rights law raises the minimum age of permissible recruitment 
while other relevant branches of international law specify an 
age of fifteen. 
Conscription is traditionally viewed as the prerogative of the 
state to require its nationals to take part in some form of na-
tional services, in this case, military service.156 By definition, 
conscription is compulsory and, thus, coerced. Failure to com-
ply with conscription often leads to imprisonment.157 The great 
majority of states do not conscript individuals under eighteen 
years of age and the Optional Protocol specifies a minimum age 
of eighteen or more. Yet, despite the existence of legal safe-
guards set by states to combat forced recruitment, inefficiency, 
corruption, and structural inadequacies mar the system; “[a]s a 
result, forced recruitment occurs even in states where legisla-
tion is in place to prohibit compulsory military service before 
the age of eighteen.”158 One of the reasons for this is that many 
states do not properly document the age of people, which has 
the effect of facilitating the recruitment of minors as a state 
can always argue that it was not aware that the child was un-
der eighteen years of age. 
As explained earlier, conscription, in its contemporary under-
standing, encompasses abductions, forced recruitment, and 
forced military training.159 The Trial Chamber of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone explained in the Armed Forces Revolu-
tionary Council (“AFRC”) case that conscription should be in-
terpreted as “encompass[ing] acts of coercion, such as abduc-
tions and forced recruitment . . . committed for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 734 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx. 
 157. For examples, see situations in Germany until 2011, and also those in 
Finland and Russian Federation. 
 158. Stephanie Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court 
of Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 537, 548 
(2002). 
 159. Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, 
¶¶ 1695, 1700, 1707 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215. 
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using them to participate actively in hostilities.”160 Even if 
children are not actually used in the conflict, their abduction 
with the aim of using them is sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for conscription.161 The law in this area has been interpreted 
such that it applies to non-international armed conflicts.162 
Although it is clear that no children under fifteen years of 
age under international humanitarian law or under eighteen 
years of age according to the Optional Protocol can be recruit-
ed, the reality is very different. Owing to the general lack of 
enforcement of such laws, e.g. punishment for armed groups 
when they recruit children, forced recruitment has become en-
demic in many of these conflicts (e.g., the conflict in Sierra Le-
one).163 
4. Enlistment 
On the other hand, enlistment, which is understood as allow-
ing individuals to enroll to join an armed force or group,164 is 
not clearly banned by international humanitarian law. To some 
extent, this lack of prohibition caters to the fact that not all 
children are forced into soldiering. As discussed earlier, many 
choose to join an armed group or a state’s armed forces of their 
own volition. 
According to international humanitarian law treaties, en-
listment is only banned in a non-international armed conflict. 
Enlistment in an international armed conflict is allowed. In-
deed, under Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I, if such chil-
dren voluntarily enlist in the armed forces, there is no obliga-
tion upon the state to refuse the new recruit.165 The general 
prohibition of recruitment in non-international armed conflicts 
under Article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II is to be welcomed 
because the great majority of cases of child recruitment today 
take place within the context of non-international armed con-
flicts. That being said, customary international humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                     
 160. AFRC Case, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 734. 
 161. RUF Case, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, ¶ 1700. 
 162. Id. ¶ 194. 
 163. Aubrey F. Mitchell III, Sierra Leone: The Road to Childhood Ruination 
Through Forced Recruitment of Child Soldiers and the World’s Failure to Act, 
2 REGENT J. INT’L L. 81, 85–87, 102–03 (2003–04). 
 164. AFRC Case, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 735. 
 165. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77(2). 
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law bans enlistment in all conflicts,166 whilst the UNCRC and 
the Optional Protocol ban enlistment of children without refer-
ring to the type of conflict involved.167 
An important aspect of the prohibition of enlistment is that 
international humanitarian law is binding upon armed forces 
and armed groups.168 In contrast, the UNCRC, as a human 
rights law treaty, can only bind a state’s armed forces.169 As 
many contemporary conflicts are of non-international nature 
and pit armed opposition groups against each other, it is im-
perative that there are provisions relating to non-state actors. 
Hence, the Optional Protocol adopts a more demanding posi-
tion, asserting that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the 
armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, 
recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 
years.”170 Still, one of the main flaws of Article 4 of the Optional 
Protocol, and any human rights instruments in general, cannot 
bind non-state actors171 as they cannot sign up to the agree-
ments in the first place. The device used to ensure compliance 
of armed opposition groups with human rights law is by virtue 
of national law inasmuch as States are, in pursuance of the Op-
tional Protocol, required to criminalize forced recruitment car-
ried out by armed opposition groups.172 Remarkably, the U.N. 
Secretary-General explains in Children and Armed Conflict 
that armed opposition groups are to be held to the same stand-
ards as those of the state in which they are fighting.173 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                     
 166. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 483–85. 
 167. Neither Article 38 of UNCRC nor Articles 1 through 4 of the Optional 
Protocol refers to the type of conflict involved. 
 168. See Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, Internation-
al Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 IRRC 47, 52–63 
(2011); Pascal Bongard & Jonathan Somer, Monitoring Armed Non-State Ac-
tor Compliance with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mecha-
nisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 93 IRRC 673, 674–75 
(2011). 
 169. Matthew Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: Harnessing 
the Security Council’s ‘Soft Power,’ 43 ISR. L. REV. 360, 364 (2010). 
 170. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(1). 
 171. See Mendez, supra note 12, at 230; see also Wasantha Seneviratne, 
International Legal Standards Applicable to Child Soldiers, 15 SRI LANKA J. 
INT’L L. 39, 41 (2003). 
 172. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(2). 
 173. See U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299 (Nov. 26, 2002). The mini-
mum standard, as spelled out in the UNCRC, Additional Protocol II, and the 
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as Matthew Happold notes “[w]hereas it is generally agreed 
that [non-state armed groups] have obligations in international 
humanitarian law, it remains disputed whether they are bound 
by international human rights law . . . .”174 
As a result, it is generally agreed that, as a matter of cus-
tomary international law, the recruitment of children under 
the fifteen years of age into armed forces and armed groups, 
whether in international or non-international armed conflict, is 
prohibited. No distinction is made as to whether recruitment 
was compulsory or voluntary. There might be an emerging 
norm barring the compulsory recruitment of children under 
eighteen years of age, but this does not seem to be universally 
accepted at the moment.175 
B. Use and Participation of Children in Armed Conflict 
In addition to the recruitment, conscription, and enlistment 
of children, international law also regulates children’s partici-
pation in armed conflict. The type of legal framework that is 
applied in regulation of children’s participation in such conflict, 
whether it be international humanitarian law, human rights 
law, international criminal law, or a combination of these, will 
determine which kinds of participation are prohibited. 
The 1977 Additional Protocols were the first international le-
gal instruments to regulate the participation of children under 
fifteen years of age. According to Article 77(2) of Additional 
Protocol I, children are barred from “tak[ing] a direct part in 
hostilities” in international armed conflict.176 In contrast, Arti-
                                                                                                                                     
Rome Statute is that “children under age 15 shall not be conscripted or en-
listed into armed groups or used by them to participate actively in hostilities 
in either international or internal armed conflicts.” Id. The higher standard 
regarding non-state armed groups is from the Optional Protocol that prohib-
its the recruitment and use of children under the age of eighteen. See Option-
al Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 174. Happold, supra note 169, at 374. 
 175. Whilst some armed opposition groups agree that no child below the age 
of eighteen years old should be recruited, others prefer to set a lower thresh-
old. For the discussion on the position of armed opposition groups on the re-
cruitment of children, see generally Jonathan Somer, Engaging Armed Non-
State Actors to Protect Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict: When the 
Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 106 (2012). 
 176. The Commentary to Article 51(3) Additional Protocol I explains that 
“‘direct’ participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are 
likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy 
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cle 4(3)(c) of the Additional Protocol II does not use the adjec-
tive “direct,” thus encompassing indirect functions such as 
“gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting mu-
nitions or foodstuffs or committing acts of sabotage.”177 This 
distinction in terminology prompted the ICRC to comment that 
since “[t]he intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to 
keep children under fifteen outside armed conflict,”178 indirect 
participation in international armed conflict should also be 
ruled out. A resolution adopted at the 26th International Con-
ference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1995 reinforces 
this position: “parties to conflict . . . take every feasible step to 
ensure that children under the age of 18 years do not take part 
in hostilities,” thereby refraining from using any adjective such 
as “direct” or “indirect” before “take part.”179 The Abo Turku 
declaration, which is considered to encapsulate minimum 
standards of humanity, also stresses that children should not 
take part in acts of violence, thereby setting a higher standard 
than the “direct participation” expression enshrined in Addi-
tional Protocol I.180 Rule 137 of the Study of Customary Inter-
                                                                                                                                     
armed forces.” PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 1944. This definition is reiter-
ated verbatim in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 99 (Dec. 6, 1999), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df. In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a publica-
tion with the aim to assist in delimiting the borders between direct and other 
types of participation in hostilities. See generally NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. For a discussion 
on this publication, see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance: Deconstructing 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2009–10). 
 177. Maria Teresa Dutli, Captured Child Combatants, 30 IRRC 421, 423 
(1990). 
 178. “The intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to keep children 
under fifteen outside armed conflict, and consequently they should not be 
required to perform such services.” PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3187. 
 179. ICRC, Resolution 2: Protection of the Civilian Population in Period of 
Armed Conflict, § C(d), 26th Int’l Conference (Jul. 12, 1995), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/26-international-
conference-resolution-2-1995.htm. 
 180. Comm. on Human Rights Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards (Declaration of Turku), 51st Sess., Jan. 30–Mar. 10, 1995, reprint-
ed in report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
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national Humanitarian Law confirms that the expression “par-
ticipat[ion] in hostilities” encompasses both direct and indirect 
acts that affect the enemy forces.181 
International human rights law also prohibits children’s par-
ticipation in armed conflict. Article 38 of the UNCRC prohibits 
the direct participation of children under fifteen years of age in 
hostilities.182 The Optional Protocol uses similar wording but 
stipulates that the age be eighteen years.183 Notwithstanding, 
one may argue that due to the wording used (i.e., “do not take 
direct part in hostilities”) these provisions seem to allow for, or 
at least do not preclude, indirect participation in hostilities.184 
In this sense, there is congruence among the UNCRC, the Op-
tional Protocol, and international humanitarian law instru-
ments in the sense that they all forbid direct participation in 
hostilities. Arguably, the relevant provision in Additional Pro-
tocol I that governs international armed conflict should be in-
terpreted as to align it with customary international humani-
tarian law.185 Therefore, it is argued that the lex specialis (i.e., 
the Additional Protocol I and customary international humani-
tarian law) goes further than human rights law in relation to 
the types of participation by children in armed conflict that it 
prohibits. 
Additional Protocol II, by virtue of the lex specialis character 
of international humanitarian law, supersedes the UNCRC and 
its Optional Protocol for those cases of non-international armed 
conflict governed by it, which means that all forms of participa-
tion are prohibited since Additional Protocol II bans all forms 
of participation. Nevertheless, to the extent that Additional 
                                                                                                                                     
tection of Minorities on its 46th Session, art. 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116 
(1995); see also Theodor Meron & Allan Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 375–81 (1991). 
 181. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 485–88. 
 182. As previously explained, the UNCRC does not bind non-state entities 
such as armed opposition groups. A notable exception is the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and the South Sudan Independence Movement which 
in July 1995 committed themselves to the UNCRC (Save the Children Swe-
den, 1996). 
 183. See Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 184. Seneviratne, supra note 171, at 43. 
 185. By virtue of the lex posterior rule and Article 31(3) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, Additional Protocol I should be interpreted in 
light of subsequent rules. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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Protocol II will not apply because of non-international armed 
conflict’s inability to reach the threshold set out in Article 1(1), 
then Article 38 of the UNCRC and Article 1 of the Optional 
Protocol will be the only legal instruments that will apply in a 
non-international armed conflict that falls within the scope of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.186 Consequently, 
one must refer to the norms established in customary interna-
tional humanitarian law that prohibit both the direct and indi-
rect participation of children in non-international armed con-
flict. Again, human rights law is less restrictive than interna-
tional humanitarian law; however, the difference lies in the set 
age because the Optional Protocol prohibits the direct partici-
pation of children under eighteen years of age. 
Whilst binding legal instruments such as treaties and cus-
tomary international law, whether relating to international 
humanitarian law or human rights law, are of utmost im-
portance, it is crucial to examine non-binding instruments as 
they often show a trend in international law. In the instance, 
non-binding instruments such as the Paris Commitments 
adopted in February 2007187 and the 1997 Cape Town Princi-
ples188 have broadened the definition of a child taking part in 
the hostilities. Both instruments deal with children below 
eighteen years of age in armed conflict. Yet, they differ in their 
approaches. Paragraph 6 of the Paris Commitments employs 
the expression “us[ing] them to participate actively in hostili-
ties,” which indicates that participation must take a direct 
                                                                                                                                     
 186. As the threshold of applicability for non-international armed conflicts 
in Additional Protocol II is high, the overwhelming majority of non-
international armed conflicts fall within the scope of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
 187. ICRC, The Paris Commitments Consolidated Version: The Paris Com-
mitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed 
Forces or Armed Groups, ¶¶ 6, 11 (2007), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/the-paris-commitments.pdf. It 
should be noted that the ICRC uses this definition. See ICRC, Child Soldiers 
and Other Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, at 2, 
Publication Ref. 0824 (2012), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0824.pdf. 
 188. United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Cape Town Principles and 
Best Practices Adopted at the Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of 
Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegra-
tion of Child Soldiers in Africa (Apr. 27–30, 1997), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf [hereinafter 
Cape Town Principles]. 
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form—though “active” is considered to be broader than “di-
rect.”189 The term “used” seems to indicate that the focus shifts 
away from the children (i.e., children take part in the hostili-
ties) and turn to those who are making them take an active 
part in the hostilities (i.e., individuals “use” children). Moreo-
ver, the choice of the word “use” rather than “participation” de-
notes an objectification of the child that clearly impacts on how 
recruitment is perceived from the perspective of those recruit-
ing children rather than of the children themselves. 
Going a step further, the 1997 Cape Town Principles concen-
trate on the concept of a child soldier, making no distinction 
between direct/active and indirect participation.190 Under the 
Principles, a child soldier is defined as “[a]ny person under 18 
years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not 
limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompany-
ing such groups, other than family members. It includes girls 
recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not, 
therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried 
arms.”191 Machel also argues for such a definition in her 2001 
follow-up book,192 and it certainly seems to better reflect the 
myriad of tasks in which children are involved.193 But does this 
mean that all forms of participation in hostilities turn children 
into child soldiers?194 
A growing body of international criminal law deals with the 
use of children under fifteen years of age in armed conflict. Ac-
cording to the Rome Statute, it is a crime to compel children to 
                                                                                                                                     
 189. For the distinction between “direct” and “active,” see Waschefort, supra 
note 73, at 194–95, 197–98. 
 190. As Janet McKnight elucidates, the distinction between direct and indi-
rect participation was abandoned. See McKnight, supra note 54, at 119. 
 191. Cape Town Principles, supra note 188, at 8 (under the heading “Defini-
tions”). 
 192. GRAÇA MACHEL, THE IMPACT OF WAR ON CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF 
PROGRESS SINCE THE 1996 UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ON CHILDREN 7 (2001). 
 193. See discussion below for the types of activities in which children are 
involved. 
 194. Janet McKnight explains that “[p]arties disagree on whether interna-
tional law is meant to protect only child combatants that directly participate 
in battle or whether such protection extends to all children involved in the 
conflict.” McKnight, supra note 54, at 115. 
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participate in armed conflict.195 During the negotiation process, 
it was argued that the expression “participate actively,”196 as 
enounced in the Rome Statute in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) under 
the context of international armed conflict and 8(2)(e)(vii) un-
der the context of non-international armed conflict,197 covers 
not only direct participation in combat activities but also mili-
tary-related activities such as “scouting, spying, sabotage, and 
the use of children as . . . couriers . . . .”198 This also includes 
such activities as taking supplies to the front line.199 The word 
“using” reinforces the wish of the drafters of the Rome Statute 
to prohibit the participation of children in hostilities in general, 
rather than in combat only. Activities “unrelated to the hostili-
ties such as food deliveries to an airbase [or] the use of domes-
tic staff in an officer’s married accommodation,”200 however, do 
not qualify as participation in hostilities.201 This infers that 
                                                                                                                                     
 195. See Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii). 
 196. In international criminal law, the word “actively” rather than “direct-
ly” is used. In IHL both “directly” and “actively” are used. Due to space con-
straints, it is not possible to elaborate here on the difference in terminology. 
For an in-depth discussion on this subject, see Waschefort, supra note 73, at 
194–95, 197–98. 
 197. See Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), (2)(b)(e)(vii). Here, 
it must be noted that the threshold of applicability for non-international 
armed conflicts is lower since it does not require that the conflict fall within 
the purview of Additional Protocol II. The crime of using children in armed 
conflict may also be committed in Geneva Convention Common Article 3 con-
flicts. 
 198. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, 1998, Re-
port of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, at 21, n.12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April 14, 1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/law/n9810105.pdf [hereinafter Report of the 
Preparatory Committee]. This interpretation is confirmed in the Lubanga 
judgment. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 
¶¶ 624–27 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
 199. The Special Court for Sierra Leone added that carrying looted goods is 
also tantamount to active participation in the hostilities. Prosecutor v. Tay-
lor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 1546 (May 18, 2012). 
 200. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 198, at 21 n.12. 
 201. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 262 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf. However, in the Taylor case, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone explained that if “a clear link between the [food-
finding] mission and the hostilities” can be demonstrated, this constitutes 
active participation in the hostilities. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶ 1479. 
2013] "NEW WARS" OF/ON CHILDREN 1087 
domestic labor, cooking, and other similar activities are there-
fore not prohibited by international law. Although these activi-
ties are “vital for group survival in terms of logistics,”202 they 
do not appear to fall within the scope of the prohibition. That 
being said the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case appears to 
have widened the remit of the prohibition as it replaced the 
test of active participation by one relating to exposure to dan-
ger.203 
An unintended consequence of broadly-defined “active partic-
ipation” in hostilities is that children might then become legit-
imate targets for military operations,204 as the Trial Chamber 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone stated in the Revolution-
ary United Front case205 and the Taylor case,206 and as the ICC 
stated in the Lubanga case.207 For this reason, one must be 
mindful not to give too broad an interpretation to the concept of 
“active participation in hostilities,” and apply it in an interna-
tional humanitarian law context since this would correspond-
ingly reduce the number of children who would be legally pro-
tected from direct attack.208 For example, the use of children to 
commit crimes against civilians is deemed to constitute active 
participation in hostilities, a position that is understandable as 
                                                                                                                                     
 202. FLORENCE TERCIER HOLST-RONESS, ICRC, VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS IN 
AFRICA DURING ARMED CONFLICTS AND CRISES (REPORT AT SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON THE AFRICAN CHILD: VIOLENCE 
AGAINST GIRLS IN AFRICA, MAY 11–12, 2006), 14, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/international-policy-conference.pdf 
(referring to activities such “cooking, fetching water and wood, cleaning, car-
ing for the sick and wounded.”). 
 203. “The decisive factor in deciding whether an indirect role is to be treat-
ed as active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the 
child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger by becoming a po-
tential target.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 
¶ 820 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
 204. See Graf, supra note 136, at 963–64. 
 205. See Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 1723 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215. 
 206. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶¶ 1459, 1604. 
 207. “All of [children’s] activities [that support combatants], which cover 
either direct or indirect participation, have an underlying common feature: 
the child concerned is, at the very least, a potential target.” Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 628 (March 14, 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
 208. Waschefort, supra note 73, at 200. 
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such acts of violence are directly linked to hostilities.209 The 
Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case explained that “[t]he deci-
sive factor, therefore, in deciding if an ‘indirect’ role is to be 
treated as active participation in hostilities is whether the sup-
port provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or 
her to real danger as a potential target.”210 In other words, a 
sweeping statement that a child is “used in hostilities” because 
any of his or her activities actively contribute to the hostilities 
is ill advised. As long as children are involved in conflict, it 
might not be sensible to broaden the concept of a child soldier 
in international humanitarian law too far and refer to “active” 
rather than “direct” participation in hostilities. This reveals 
that the current liberal approach of the international commu-
nity towards the child soldier phenomenon (e.g., definition such 
as the one enshrined in the Cape Town Principles) is at odds 
with international humanitarian law and the realities of war; 
this concept appears to be better grasped by international crim-
inal tribunals. 
III. THE DISCOURSE CONDEMNING CHILD SOLDIERING: A 
“POLITICS OF AGE” 
David M. Rosen argues that “the ‘problem’ of child soldiers . . 
. derives not from any new phenomenon of young people being 
present on the battlefield but, rather, from an emerging trans-
national ‘politics of age’ that shapes the concept of ‘childhood’ 
in international law.”211 As demonstrated earlier, the child sol-
dier phenomenon is not new; in the past, those young people 
taking part in the hostilities were not branded “child soldier” 
but “brave young men” or young “heroes.”212 The key explana-
tion for this seems to be the adoption of a human rights dis-
course, especially a discourse of children’s rights, rather than 
an international humanitarian law framework. This discourse 
stems from the liberal Western values that define childhood213 
                                                                                                                                     
 209. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶ 1604. 
 210. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶ 628. 
 211. Rosen, supra note 18. 
 212. See Lee, supra note 21, at 3. 
 213. As Nancy Kendall explains, “international definitions of childhood and 
vulnerability have been critiqued as rooted in Western ideas about individu-
als and their relationships.” Nancy Kendall, Gendered Moral Dimensions of 
Childhood Vulnerability, 2 CHILD. AFR. 26, 27 (2010). 
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as a long period of innocence and fun,214 and it aims to spread 
such values universally. Moreover by taking a human rights 
approach to the issue of child soldiering, the liberal discourse 
becomes a humanitarian one that indistinctively strips chil-
dren of their autonomy and thus ability to be agents of their 
own lives and portrays them as innocent victims. 
A. Universality 
The first main factor for this change in the liberal discourse 
is a re-conceptualization of childhood as “a particular genera-
tional and cultural space.”215 The current state of international 
law models is based on the assumption that “childhood is dif-
ferent from adulthood and that it requires special protec-
tion,”216 for children are perceived “as defenceless, unable to 
protect themselves and therefore dependent” on others.217 
International humanitarian law takes two seemingly contra-
dictory approaches in this regard. On the one hand, it offers 
special protection to children (new-born,218 children under sev-
en,219 children under twelve,220 children under fifteen,221 and 
                                                                                                                                     
 214. Hart, supra note 10, at 219–20 (noting that under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, a childhood is intended to last until 
the age of eighteen); Pupavac, supra note 53 (noting that “a prerequisite for 
the Western protective model of childhood [is] . . . ‘happiness, love and under-
standing.’”). 
 215. James & James, supra note 11, at 31–32; see also Happold, supra note 
169, at 361 (arguing that “perceptions of the boundaries and dimensions of 
childhood have changed.”). 
 216. See Kendall, supra 213, at 27; Breen, supra note 113, at 73; McNee, 
supra note 31, at 20 (quoting Mary Galbraith, Hear My Cry: A Manifesto for 
an Emancipatory Childhood Studies Approach to Children’s Literature, 25 
LION & UNICORN 187, 190 (2001)); RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED 
FORCES, supra note 9, at 9–14. Moreover, the way we see children and “the 
ways we behave toward them . . . shape” a child’s experience as a child and 
his/her involvement with the adult world. James & James, supra note 11, at 
27. 
 217. Julia Fionda, Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in LEGAL 
CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD 1, 9 (Julia Fionda ed., 2001). 
 218. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, art. 17 (noting “maternity 
cases”). 
 219. See id. art. 14 (prescribing access for children under seven and their 
mothers to hospital and safety zones); see also id. art. 38(5) (mothers of chil-
dren under seven years benefit from preferential treatment). 
 220. See id. art. 24 (wearing of identification to preserve their identity in 
case they are separated from their parents). 
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children under eighteen222). On the other, the Geneva Conven-
tions, the Additional Protocols, and customary international 
humanitarian law do not differentiate between children and 
adults who take a direct part in the hostilities. When children 
are involved in hostilities, they are considered as combatants in 
international armed conflicts or persons taking a direct part in 
the hostilities223 who can be targeted.224 And if captured, the 
children benefit from the treatment of prisoners of war in in-
ternational armed conflicts225 or if in non-international armed 
conflicts, they can be captured and prosecuted for taking part 
in the hostilities.226 What international humanitarian law pro-
hibits is the recruitment of children, thus pointing the finger at 
those who recruit them. Children as such are not violating in-
ternational humanitarian law by taking a direct part in the 
hostilities. Whilst this indicates that international humanitari-
an law is rather blind to the notion of childhood, in contradis-
tinction to adulthood, once children are participants, this posi-
tion fails to acknowledge that international humanitarian law 
seeks to prevent the participation of children under fifteen 
years of age in armed conflict in the first place and, thus, in-
                                                                                                                                     
 221. See id. art. 14 (prescribing access for them and their mothers to hospi-
tal and safety zones); id. art. 23 (provision of relief supplies); id. art. 24 (child 
welfare facilities); id. art. 38(5) (preferential treatment). 
 222. See id. art. 68(4) (protection against the death penalty); Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77(5); Additional Protocol II, supra note 26, art. 
6(4). 
 223. Stuart Maslen, Kinder sind keine Soldaten—politische und rechtliche 
Aspekte des Phänomens Kindersoldaten [Children Are Not Soldiers—Political 
and Legal Aspects of the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers], in FRIEDRICH-EBERT-
STIFTUNG & UNICEF, supra note 65, at 23, 25. 
 224. When children participate in hostilities, they “lose their inviolability as 
non-combatants; indeed, they become ‘legitimate’ military targets, individu-
als whose death or disablement result in that weakening of the armed forces 
of the enemy which is the only legitimate aim in war.” GUY GOODWIN-GILL & 
ILENE COHN, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 70 
(1994). 
 225. The Commentary on the Additional Protocols explains that 
“[t]heoretically prisoners of war may be very young or very old.” PILLOUD ET 
AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3194. 
 226. Individuals, whether adults or children, who take part in hostilities in 
non-international armed conflicts can, under domestic law, be detained and 
prosecuted for taking part in the hostilities. See David M. Rosen, Who Is a 
Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 81, 88–
90 (2009). 
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stinctively disapproves of their involvement in hostilities.227 In 
other words, international humanitarian law distinguishes be-
tween childhood and adulthood, and it follows the international 
trend set in recent years by international human rights law. 
The key is to demarcate the Rubicon between childhood and 
adulthood. Technically, there are two ways to do this: either to 
set a specific age for adulthood or to link adulthood to certain 
skills and abilities. As Schmidt argues, “[i]n liberal thought, 
chronological age draws a clear demarcating line between 
childhood and adulthood,”228 which is a position found also in 
the international legal and humanitarian discourse. The new 
political agenda propagating the “straight eighteen” position229 
aims to set up a new cultural and legal norm that will lead to a 
single international definition of childhood as beginning at 
birth and ending at age eighteen.230 The most common age for 
individuals to obtain special protections under international 
humanitarian law is fifteen years of age.231 A literal interpreta-
tion232 of the relevant provisions demonstrates that interna-
tional humanitarian law considers a child to be anyone under 
eighteen years of age.233 Rosen argues that this holds “open the 
possibility that the concept of ‘childhood’ could be extended be-
yond [the age of fifteen].”234 Moreover, “[t]o adopt a general no-
tion of ‘child’ in the absence of a definition, as being relevant 
only those under 15 years of age, would be detrimental to the 
                                                                                                                                     
 227. See ICRC, Plan of Action Concerning Children in Armed Conflict, at 3–
4, Ref. 95/CD/10/1 (Feb. 12, 1995), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/movement-plan-of-action-children-
1995.pdf [hereinafter Plan of Action] (“Objective 1.2.[:] Prevent children from 
joining armed forces or groups by offering them alternatives to enlistment.”). 
 228. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 57. 
 229. “[I]nternational advocacy has now created a human rights framework, 
that raises the minimum age for recruitment and participation in hostilities 
from fifteen to eighteen.” Coomaraswamy, supra note 140, at 536; see also 
Lee, supra note 21. 
 230. See Rosen, supra note 18, at 296–97; see also Matthew Happold, Child 
Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. LA. VERNE L. REV. 56, 69–70 (2008). 
 231. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 479–82. 
 232. See generally Daniel Helle, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 82 
IRRC 797 (2000). 
 233. The Conventions refer to “persons under 18 years of age” and “children 
under 15” thereby implying that there are children above fifteen years of age. 
See id. at 803–04; Fox, supra note 13, at 31. 
 234. Rosen, supra note 18, at 301. 
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interest of the child and thus not in conformity with the spirit 
underlying international humanitarian law.”235 
Nevertheless, the Commentaries to the relevant treaty provi-
sions do not seem to entirely support this standpoint. The 
Commentary to Article 14 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
explains that the age of fifteen was set to match the “physical 
and mental development of children,”236 though Article 77 of 
Additional Protocol I concedes that “some flexibility is appro-
priate, for there are individuals who remain children, both 
physically and mentally, after the age of fifteen.”237 Therefore, 
it is difficult to rigidly conclude for purposes of international 
humanitarian law that a child is simply anyone under eighteen 
years of age. 
Furthermore, whereas international humanitarian law does 
not prohibit the recruitment and participation of children 
above fifteen years of age, the ICRC, together with the Nation-
al Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, considers that no 
children under eighteen years of age should be recruited or 
used in hostilities.238 This, of course, follows the Optional Pro-
tocol and the latest position in international human rights law 
that define children as persons younger than eighteen years of 
age. For example, the 1995 Plan of Action Concerning Children 
in Armed Conflict shows that the International Movement of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent militates in favor of no re-
cruitment and no use of children under the age of eighteen.239 
Should international humanitarian law follow a policy that is 
congruent with international human rights law? This would be 
difficult to achieve because, interestingly, some of the oppo-
nents to the straight eighteen approach are liberal states such 
as the United States of America and the United Kingdom even 
though they have ratified the Optional Protocol. 
                                                                                                                                     
 235. Helle, supra note 232, at 804. 
 236. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 
12 AUGUST 1949: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 126 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958). 
 237. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3179. 
 238. Plan of Action, supra note 227, at 1 (“Commitment 1: To promote the 
principle of non-recruitment and non-participation in armed conflict of chil-
dren under the age of 18 years.”); see also ICRC, Peace, International Human-
itarian Law and Human Rights, § 1.5, Council of Delegates Res. No. 8 (Nov. 
27, 1997). 
 239. Plan of Action, supra note 227, at 1. 
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The straight eighteen approach appears to contradict estab-
lished cultural and local norms. Given that international hu-
man rights law is based on universal ethical standards,240 some 
claim that the straight eighteen approach does not 
acknowledge local and regional cultures and traditions, includ-
ing differing views as to who is a child and who is an adult.241 
Hence, a contextual approach that pays heed to “the culturally 
constructed” and developed ideas and “practices of childhood 
versus adulthood”242 might be more appropriate in this area. 
Remarkably, this is also the approach taken by Article 1 of the 
UNCRC, since this provision states that adulthood can be 
reached before eighteen years of age if majority is attained ear-
lier in a specific state, thus allowing states to set an age for ma-
jority that is in line with cultural and social norms.243 Contex-
tualists, who interpret the law by paying particular attention 
to the social and cultural context in which norms are applied, 
contend that the cut-off age between childhood and adulthood 
needs to be challenged.244 Initiation rites, culturally scripted 
phenomena that are not determined by an abstract age, are the 
true markers of the passage into adulthood.245 Conspicuously, 
there is a difference between the categorizations and defini-
tions made by local communities and those established by the 
international legal discourse.246 
                                                                                                                                     
 240. “[S]ome basic human goods span the considerable diversity of modern 
cultures and support a set of ethical standards that are universal at least for 
the world as we know it and human beings as we know them.” Amy Gut-
mann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 171, 193 (1993). 
 241. See generally Rosen, supra note 18; Child Soldier Recruitment, supra 
note 66. 
 242. Fox, supra note 13, at 43. 
 243. UNCRC, supra note 22. 
 244. See generally Rosen, supra note 18; Child Soldier Recruitment, supra 
note 66. 
 245. “One of the most important of these differences was that communities 
did not view 18 as the age at which children suddenly transitioned to adult-
hood.” Kendall, supra 213, at 32; see also Child Soldier Recruitment, supra 
note 66, at 52. 
 246. See McKnight, supra note 54, at 125. This discourse informs and is fed 
by “researchers [who] tend to assume a ‘universal decontextualized model of 
child development.’ That is, researchers tend to forget that ‘childhood, adoles-
cence and adulthood are . . . socially defined statuses which include social 
expectations that differ across cultures.’” ED CAIRNS, CHILDREN AND POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 166 (1996); see also Lee, supra note 21, at 8. 
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Anthropological research underwrites this assertion, stress-
ing that “there are a multiplicity of childhoods, each culturally 
codified and defined by age, ethnicity, gender, history, location, 
and so forth.”247 Since law is applied within a specific context, 
ignoring such context whilst drafting universal norms inevita-
bly leads to discrepancies between the state of the law and its 
application.248 The importance of cultural legitimacy of interna-
tional human rights norms is overlooked. 
While the efforts of the NGO community to limit the extent 
and number of individuals embroiled in armed conflicts must 
be praised, it should be stressed that NGOs and political 
groups discount the “more varied and complex local under-
standings of children and childhood found in anthropological 
research.”249 Article 1 of the UNCRC acknowledges this asser-
tion by leaving states some leeway in deciding when majority is 
attained.250 The definition of a child soldier under UNCRC 
clashes with local understandings of the involvement of young 
people in armed conflicts.251 For example, anthropologists point 
out that “[i]t is a misnomer in many parts of Africa to call a 14-
year-old carrying an AK-47 a child soldier since local people 
may regard that young person as an adult”252 and that child-
hood and military life are not necessary understood as either 
incompatible or contradictory.253 Moreover, the demography of 
African countries, where the population is mainly comprised of 
children—individuals under eighteen254—helps to explain the 
fact that children there often take on earlier adult responsibili-
                                                                                                                                     
 247. Rosen, supra note 18, at 297. 
 248. See Jonasen, supra note 42, at 316. 
 249. Rosen, supra note 18. 
 250. “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every hu-
man being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier.” UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 1. 
 251. See Rosen, supra note 18, at 297. 
 252. Michael Wessells & Davidson Jonah, Recruitment and Reintegration of 
Former Youth Soldiers in Sierra Leone: Challenges of Reconciliation and 
Post-accord Peacebuilding, in TROUBLEMAKERS OR PEACEMAKERS? YOUTH AND 
POST-ACCORD PEACEBUILDING 27, 29 (Siobhan McEvoy-Levy ed., 2006). 
 253. For example, “[t]he Dinka of the Sudan initiated boys into warriorhood 
between ages 16 and 18.” Rosen, supra note 18, at 297. 
 254. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 49–50. 
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ties255 and are more politically and socially aware than their 
counterparts in the West. African children are also often en-
trusted with responsibilities that Western liberal culture may 
consider as an abuse of their rights even though they are ac-
ceptable under certain cultural contexts.256 For example, chil-
dren may assist “relatives on market stalls and in small family 
businesses.”257 Street vending and running errands are also 
common tasks given to children.258 Also, in this context, adoles-
cence is defined as “a pre-adult phase.”259 Nonetheless, it must 
be borne in mind that the danger to which children are exposed 
as soldiers can hardly be “justified by arguments based on cul-
tural and regional variations regarding the maturity of child 
soldiers.”260 
The approach adopted by international humanitarian law is 
one that seems to align better with the views of contextualists 
because it sets the age of childhood in relation to recruitment 
and participation in hostilities at fifteen rather than eighteen 
years of age. As the Commentary to Additional Protocol II ex-
plains, “[t]he moment at which a person ceases to be a child 
and becomes an adult is not judged in the same way every-
where in the world. Depending on the culture, the age may 
vary between about fifteen and eighteen years.”261 Aware of the 
significant cross-cultural variation in the ages of childhood, the 
drafters of Additional Protocol II could not agree to raise the 
age of recruitment and participation to eighteen years of age 
because national legislations were too divergent.262 Similarly, 
the bulk of the discussions that took place during the negotia-
tions of Additional Protocol I focused on cultural and regional 
                                                                                                                                     
 255. Farkhanda Zia-Mansoor, The Dilemma of Child Soldiers: Who is Re-
sponsible?, 16 KINGS C.L.J. 388, 389 (2005); see also Schmidt, supra note 116, 
at 58. 
 256. See generally Chris A. Ike & Kwaku Twumasi-Ankrah, Child Abuse 
and Child Labour Across Culture: Implications for Research, Prevention and 
Policy Implementation, 14 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 109 (1999). 
 257. Sylvia Chant & Gareth A. Jones, Youth, Gender and Livelihoods in 
West Africa: Perspectives from Ghana and The Gambia, 3 CHILD. 
GEOGRAPHIES 185, 190 (2005). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Stark, Boothby & Ager, supra note 6. 
 260. Breen, supra note 113, at 79. 
 261. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 4549. 
 262. Id. ¶ 4556. 
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variations in relation to child soldiering.263 Consequently, the 
age of fifteen was adopted as the lowest common denominator. 
B. Autonomy 
When a rights-based approach is adopted in relation to child 
soldiers, one has to address the concept of autonomy upon 
which the liberal human rights enterprise is founded. In a 
modern world led by liberal thoughts, the individual is con-
ceived as someone who has the capacity and autonomy to act. 
The individual, who is viewed as independent and self-
sufficient,264 is taken to be an essentially rational actor,265 
someone who is able to contribute to a society266 that values his 
or her capacity to act. Autonomy literally means living by one’s 
own law; it is the ability to make certain decisions for oneself 
without undue interference from others. According to liberal 
thought, “[t]he individual is . . . attributed with knowledge of 
his own best interests and the ability to pursue them rational-
ly.”267 
This discourse, however, is difficult to apply to children who 
are viewed as not having fully developed autonomy even 
though the UNCRC clearly spells out in its Article 12 that 
“States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his or her own views the right to express those views freely 
in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being 
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.”268 It is at this point where the liberal discourse 
seems to contradict itself; on the one hand liberals wish chil-
                                                                                                                                     
 263. See id. ¶ 3179 (noting that “[t]he age of puberty varies, depending on 
climate, race and the individual,” thereby again taking into account the 
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dren to enjoy their autonomy and their rights269 but on the oth-
er hand, they—probably influenced by a more humanitarian 
discourse—regard children as innocent human beings whose 
safety and rights should be protected and promoted and whose 
needs must be adequately addressed.270 Liberals often view 
children as victims, as vulnerable individuals who need to be 
helped by adults as adults appear to know best what their in-
terests are. As a result, the discourses of children as victims 
and individuals as autonomous agents of their own fate clash. 
As Alice Macdonald summarizes, “[t]he emergence of individual 
agency threatens discourses of victimhood.”271 Yet, liberals 
have tempered their claims of autonomy and rights to empha-
size the protection of children and the principle of the best in-
terests of the child as enshrined in Article 3(1) of the 
UNCRC.272 This can be explained in the following manner: 
Some liberals tend to believe that those “who reject [the liberal] 
human-rights culture should change their ways” and that “this 
culture is a morally superior way of life.”273 Thus, liberals wish 
to extend their ideas on a universal level, and this means in-
tervening and engaging in a discourse of the others borders on 
paternalism.274 In their eyes, children are not autonomous in-
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dividuals, endowed with the ability to make decisions; on the 
contrary, children are vulnerable individuals. There are several 
reasons that explain this position. 
First, a liberal approach tends to regard children as being 
unable to make conscious and informed decisions, especially 
when this concerns their participation in armed hostilities. Af-
ter all, the Western society identifies childhood with innocence 
and play. It is widely understood that children have a limited 
capacity to understand the world. This inability plays against 
the child in the liberal discourse inasmuch as he or she is 
coaxed into recruitment and used in hostilities because he or 
she is obedient, easy to manipulate, and lacks fear when en-
gaged in battle.275 It is also easy to indoctrinate a child.276 It is 
not difficult to convince a child to take part in hostilities with-
out the child fully understanding the consequences of his or her 
acts.277 Ethics, culture, and society are often used to legitimate 
the use of child soldiers:278 defending one’s people and home-
land from violent aggression or political oppression279 and be-
ing able to provide for one’s family.280 They are fighting for a 
cause “that is portrayed as being in their political and economic 
best interests.”281 But does this mean that children are not psy-
chologically able to make informed decisions? At this juncture, 
it must be underlined that whilst the international community 
often shows young children taking part in the hostilities, “ado-
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lescents make up the vast majority of child soldiers worldwide . 
. . .”282 Their understanding of the situation is undoubtedly dif-
ferent from the one of an eight year old.283 The conflicts in Sier-
ra Leone and Liberia have demonstrated that this distinction 
between younger and older children was even institutionalized 
as the younger ones between nine and thirteen years old of age 
were enrolled in the “Small Boy Units” while adolescents were 
not classified as boys anymore but full-fledged soldiers,284 often 
in charge of younger children. 
Also, if children are not able to make informed decisions, 
then one may ask how much children nowadays differ from 
those who took part in past conflicts.285 One possible answer is 
that whereas past conflicts could be easily understood as one 
state fighting against another state, the “new wars” are incred-
ibly difficult to understand, even for adults. The recruitment of 
seventeen years old children in the British forces appears ac-
ceptable to the public as it appears that he will likely be 
fighting in a conventional war. Further, Western society be-
lieves that this individual is deciding to take on a career in the 
armed forces.286 Yet, a child of the same age engulfed and in-
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universities to lay the foundations for their future lives, not dying in a road-
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volved in a “new war” in another state raises eyebrows even 
though, as Roger Rosenblatt argues, “[a] kid fighting with a 
bunch of rebels is far more apt to know why he is doing it than 
a recruit of a national guard.”287 Fighting in an armed group or 
even in the armed forces of a non-liberal and democratic state 
is perceived to be a judicious career path.288 
Perhaps, at the very least, the liberal discourse seems to miss 
the point that with age and experience, children are able to ac-
quire the ability to understand the world and thus become ac-
tive agents of their own lives. Indeed, “[a]lthough, in many are-
as of the world, people are deemed to be intellectually and emo-
tionally mature at earlier ages, eighteen years of age appears 
to be the most widely accepted point at which individuals are 
no longer considered children.”289 For example, “[i]t is generally 
accepted that from the age of 15 the development of a child’s 
faculties is such that there is no longer the same need for spe-
cial, systematic measures.”290 Therefore, international humani-
tarian law appears to be more in line with this reality than in-
ternational human rights law, which sets eighteen years of age 
as the end of childhood. In other words, international humani-
tarian law takes it that children beyond fifteen are capable of 
autonomy. 
Reverting to the issue of the “new wars” and bearing in mind 
that it might indeed be difficult for children to understand the 
intricacies of such conflicts, one can reasonably ask whether 
international humanitarian law’s approach is appropriate. In-
ternational humanitarian law is principally built on the idea of 
traditional armed forces, and the bulk of the law pertains to 
international armed conflicts and non-international conflicts 
between armed forces and armed opposition groups.291 Is inter-
national humanitarian law, particularly its provisions on child 
soldiers, outdated? It might be, but even though customary in-
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ternational humanitarian law covers additional types of con-
flicts, particularly non-international armed conflicts in which 
two armed opposition groups fight against each other, it still 
allows for the recruitment and use of children above fifteen 
years of age.292 In fact, customary international humanitarian 
law cannot be altered unless those taking part in the hostili-
ties—both state and non-state actors—change their behavior or 
practice and also consider that by doing so, they are bound by a 
legal norm.293 As of now, there is no solid evidence that states 
and armed opposition groups consider the recruitment and par-
ticipation of children between fifteen and eighteen years of age 
to be a violation of international humanitarian law. 
A second reason why liberals have tempered their claims of 
autonomy and rights and emphasized the protection of children 
and the principle of the best interest of the child can be ex-
plained by the persistent and unceasing discourse of children 
as victims and vulnerable individuals,294 especially within the 
context of armed conflict.295 The mainstream liberal view is 
that children cannot properly be considered perpetrators of vio-
lent acts and that their actions must be understood by looking 
at the wider social context; “the neo-liberal approach often in-
volves viewing children as passive victims that must be saved 
through legal protections.”296 On the other hand, the reality is 
much grimmer. 
Indeed, many children are full participants in the armed con-
flict. Their participation ranges from helping out with cooking 
or managing the camp to committing atrocities. In many of 
these conflicts, after being forced to perform ritualistic kill-
ings,297 such as killing their family or their relatives,298 chil-
dren are provided with some rudimentary training on how to 
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operate weapons.299 They gradually enter a process of military 
socialization that aims to transform them into killing ma-
chines, a practice that can be witnessed in various African 
states.300 The Taylor judgment is replete of sad examples of 
crimes committed by children.301 Generally, children who live 
in such an environment tend to lose their personality and iden-
tity,302 as well as any connection to the real world.303 Further-
more, by living in such a violent world—where disorder and 
arbitrariness are commonplace—they lose touch with any con-
cepts of morality that may have been inculcated to them before 
they joined the armed groups.304 Indeed “[c]hildren participat-
ing in hostilities are a deadly threat, not only to themselves, 
but also to the persons whom their impassioned and immature 
nature may lead them to shoot at.”305 African conflicts show 
that many children, trapped in a world of sustained and or-
chestrated violence, turn into merciless killers,306 becoming 
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“horde[s] of insensate killers”307 that are still portrayed in the 
liberal discourses as innocent individuals.308 
Children should not only be seen as reluctant participants in 
armed conflicts but also as active agents. It is imperative to 
understand the reality on the ground in order to be in a posi-
tion to fully appreciate the hurdles faced by those trying to set 
new legal norms. The current international discourse decontex-
tualizes child soldiers from the social, political, and economic 
context that regulates their lives.309 One might question 
whether children trapped in such a situation are still able to 
genuinely consent to their participation in the conflict, or are 
simply the means to an end for the armed group. It is reported 
that child soldiers often feel empowered through their experi-
ences of fighting,310 bearing arms,311 and killing.312 For some, 
being in an armed group means enhanced opportunities, au-
tonomy, and respect.313 
At this stage, the concept of “agency” must be introduced. The 
liberal discourse is uneasy with regard to the application of the 
concept of “agency” to children, for its “focus on the rights of 
autonomous actors does not . . . account for individuals—
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specifically children—whose autonomous identity is not yet ful-
ly formed.”314 Agency is a form of autonomy that focuses on the 
capacity to conceive and act upon projects and values, including 
those outside of one’s own experiences.315 Agency, as explained 
by Alcinda Honwana, “concerns events of which an individual 
is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any 
phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. 
Whatever happened would not have happened if that individu-
al had not intervened.”316 Thus, the agent must have trans-
formative capacity—“the power to intervene or to refrain from 
intervention.”317 
Are children agents of their own lives, that is, do they have 
the capacity to make informed choices? The simple answer 
seems to be in the affirmative, at least to a large extent. For 
example, “[i]n all conflicts, children can take, and some choose 
to take, an active role in supporting violence. Children make 
calculated decisions during armed conflict about how to access 
shelter, food, medicine, and best ways to keep themselves and 
their family members safe.”318 This shows that some children 
do in fact manipulate situations in order to turn them into op-
portunities. Alcinda Honwana refers to “tactical agency,” “a 
specific type of agency that is devised to cope with the concrete, 
immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximize the 
circumstances created by their military and violent environ-
ment.”319 Similarly, Schmidt contends that children, as actors 
in a conflict, make rational choices based on the “[limited] in-
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formation they possess and their [limited] ability to weigh one 
choice against another . . . .”320 
Notwithstanding this, it could also be argued that a child sol-
dier’s actions are constrained by his or her weak position, and 
that in reality, he or she is acting in relation to a specific event 
rather than looking at the long-term consequences of his or her 
actions.321 It might thus be argued that these children are in-
deed not autonomous. Furthermore, whilst children may exer-
cise their agency, they do so without a moral compass and ethi-
cal guidance. To illustrate the point, it is worth noting that 
some child soldiers attain positions of command in armed 
groups and become leaders by actively participating in the hos-
tilities and committing the worst atrocities (e.g., committing 
murders, punishing and executing fellow child soldiers, press-
ganging other children into armed groups).322 The liberal ap-
proach to autonomy presupposes a conception of a morally au-
tonomous agent.323 Again, this can hardly be applied to child 
soldiers. Another factor that needs to be taken into account is 
the age and maturity of a child. A child soldier can be a teenag-
er as well as an eight-year-old. As such, in the context of child 
soldiers, it is indeed a fine line between victimhood, autonomy, 
and agency. The reality is thus more complex than the one por-
trayed in the liberal discourse. 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing again on the comparison between the African boy 
soldier and Joan of Arc—the French heroine and Catholic 
Saint—the phenomenon of child soldiering must be understood 
in its historical context, bearing in mind the rise of the human 
rights ideology that has led the world to look at child soldiering 
through the prism of children’s rights rather than through in-
ternational humanitarian law. 
Children are shaped by their experiences but are “also 
shaped by the nature of the childhood that they experience.”324 
Liberals, however, seek to produce a social construction of 
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childhood that reinforces a social legal order in which adults 
are autonomous individuals protecting the innocent child,325 
who is endowed with a range of rights, the most significant of 
these being that all actions should be taken for the child’s best 
interests.326 This paternalistic stance ensures that children 
who willingly take part in hostilities will be deemed to have 
lost control of their possibly limited agency. In this view, 
fighting is for adults only. 
Broadly speaking, international law seeks to protect children 
from becoming child soldiers. For instance, the recruitment, 
conscription, enlistment, and use of children in armed conflict 
are clearly prohibited, but at the same time, international law 
acknowledges that children can be full participants in hostili-
ties. The current trend in international law, however, is trying 
to remove all children from the battlefield, thus revealing in-
ternational law’s unwillingness to concede that children might 
be able to make autonomous decisions; “[r]ecruitment, whether 
enforced or voluntary, is always against the best interests of 
the child.”327 
That is not to say that child soldiering is a positive experi-
ence or that the fact that they volunteer can be used to justify 
the appalling treatment that ensues. Whilst children should be 
allowed to decide their involvement in hostilities on their own, 
this choice needs to be informed and viable alternatives need to 
be presented to such children. Experience shows that even 
children who suffered terribly at the hands of the armed forces 
often chose, once released or demobilized, to return to the mists 
of war.328 Indeed, if they take part, whether directly or indirect-
ly, in the hostilities, it is likely that once the conflict is over, 
these children will be unable to be regarded “as active agents, 
as productive people in society”329 even though it is proven that 
“children’s agency [is] conducive to rehabilitation and dealing 
with trauma and fear.”330 They will have “to play the part of 
innocent victims” to benefit from international aid and the pro-
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grams set up in the framework of disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration processes.331 If they fail to do so, the on-
ly other viable alternative is to return to what they know: war. 
Therefore, “[f]undamental to any effort to address child re-
cruitment is the acquisition of insight into the roles, responsi-
bilities, and competencies of children themselves.”332 Without 
understanding why children join or become participants in 
armed conflicts, the international campaign to prevent the re-
cruitment of child soldiers is bound to fail. To ensure that fewer 
children take part in conflicts, a whole range of measures—
“preventive, suppressive, educational and rehabilitative in na-
ture”333—must be enacted. More crucially, these measures 
must be designed under the influence of what children have to 
say so as to give them a voice in the debate on the recruitment 
and participation of children in armed conflict. 
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